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I. Introduction
The American tax rate often exceeds thirty percent, making it
important for foreigners investing in the United States to
understand how their transactions will be taxed. One problem
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facing foreign investors is the American tax system's double
taxation of corporations, which results in double taxation of
corporate dividends. The dividend exclusion proposal and the
other alternatives would result in only one level of taxation.'
I The discussion about corporate tax integration began more than ten years ago.
The report titled "Report of the Department of the Treasury on Integration of the
Individual and Corporate Tax Systems: Taxing Business Income Once" issued in
January 1992 by the United States Treasury Department is a milestone on this issue. See
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY ON INTEGRATION
OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS: TAXING BUSINESS INCOME ONCE
(1992), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/integration-paper/index.html
[hereinafter 1992 TREASURY REPORT]. It was followed by other studies. See, e.g., ALVIN
C. WARREN, JR., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT -
REPORTER'S STUDY OF CORPORATE TAX INTEGRATION (1993).
In December 1992, the Treasury Department issued "A Recommendation for
Integration of the Individual and Corporate Tax Systems," which brought some changes
to the 1992 Treasury Report, and recommended the adoption of the dividend exclusion
for implementing integration. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, A RECOMMENDATION FOR
INTEGRATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND CORPORATE TAX SYSTEMS (Dec. 1992),
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/integration-paper/recommendation-for-
integration.pdf; see also John K. McNulty, Corporate Income Tax Reform in the United
States: Proposals for Integration of the Corporate and Individual Income Taxes, and
International Aspects, 12 INT'L TAX & BUS. LAW. 161 (1994).
The discussion finally came to the practice field. On January 7, 2003, President
Bush announced a proposal that would, among other things, exclude dividends from
taxable income. See OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC'Y, PRESIDENT BUSH TAKING ACTION TO
STRENGTHEN AMERICA'S ECONOMY (Jan. 7, 2003), http://www.white
house.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030107.html. On January 14, the Treasury
Department published two fact sheets explaining the Proposal and highlighting how it
would stimulate economic growth. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FACT SHEET: THE
PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL TO END THE DOUBLE TAX ON CORPORATE EARNINGS (Jan. 14,
2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/kd3762.htm; U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, FACT
SHEET: ENDING THE DOUBLE TAX ON CORPORATE EARNINGS (Jan. 14, 2003),
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/kd3761.htm. On January 21, the Treasury
Department released a more detailed explanation of the Proposal. See U.S. TREASURY
DEP'T, TREASURY RELEASES DETAILS OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIVIDEND EXCLUSION
PROPOSAL (Jan. 21, 2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/kd3781.htm. This
explanation was reproduced in the General Explanations of the Administration's Fiscal
Year 2004 Revenue Proposals issued by the Department of the Treasury on February 3,
2003. U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S
FISCAL YEAR 2004 REVENUE PROPOSALS (Feb. 3, 2003), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/
releases/2003239585516578.htm [hereinafter REVENUE PROPOSAL 2004]. And finally, in
March 2003, the Joint Committee on Taxation of the 108th Congress, 1st Session, issued
the Description of Revenue Provisions Contained in the President's Fiscal Year 2004
Budget Proposal. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT'S FISCAL YEAR 2004 BUDGET
PROPOSAL (Comm. Print 2003), http://www.house.gov/jct/s-7-03.pdf [hereinafter JOINT
INCOME TAX TREATIES
Another problem for foreign shareholders is international
double taxation - taxation by the United States (jurisdiction of the
income source) and by the domicile jurisdiction of the foreign
taxpayer, and vice versa. There are several measures a country
may adopt to avoid double taxation, however, including tax
credits, exemption, exclusions or tax allowances, and tax treaties.
Only a few industrialized countries do not provide integration
of corporate and individuals' income tax systems (e.g. Switzerland
and Netherlands). The classical system of double taxation "makes
it more difficult for U.S. companies to compete against foreign
imports at home, or in foreign markets through exports from the
United States, or through foreign direct investment.",2  But
"[c]ritics of the proposal have questioned whether there will be a
substantial effect on corporate investment because persons not
subject to the individual income tax (e.g., foreign persons and tax-
exempt institutions such as pension funds) hold substantial
amounts of corporate equity."3
Two major problems related to international taxation arise
from the proposal of integration of corporate tax. The first is
whether the United States will somehow grant or deny the benefits
of integration to foreign shareholders (inbound transactions). The
second is whether the proposed model would consider corporate
income taxes paid abroad the same as income taxes paid to the
United States (outbound transactions).4 This article addresses only
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003].
The Proposal was not approved. However, the U.S. Congress enacted the Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752, 108th
Cong., 1st Sess. (2003) [hereinafter 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT], taxing "qualified divided
income," at the same rates applied to "net capital gain" when received by domestic
shareholders (individuals). 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT, Sec. 302, 1.R.C. § l(h)(3) (2003). In
brief, it means that the tax rate for qualified dividend income received by individuals
(beginning January 1, 2003), is fifteen percent, and low-income shareholders, i.e.,
taxpayers at 10 or 15 percent marginal brackets, will pay five percent instead of the
progressive tax rates as applied before the 2003 Tax Relief Act. See STEPHEN A. LIND ET
AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS - STUDENT
UPDATE MEMORANDUM 1-2, 11-12 (5th ed. 2003); see also infra notes 6 and 8 for
detailed effects of the 2003 Act.
2 U.S. GOV'T PRINTING OFFICE, ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 210 (Feb.
2003), http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy04/pdf/2003_erp.pdf [hereinafter
ECONOMIC REPORT 2003].
3 JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 29.
4 See McNulty, supra note 1, at 235. The income tax is based on worldwide
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the first issue.
The purpose of this article is to compare three systems of
corporate tax integration - dividend exclusion, imputation system,
and deduction - as these apply to dividends received by foreign
shareholders from domestic corporations (passive investment).
This article will consider the effects of income tax treaties,
commonly referred to as "treaties to avoid double taxation," in
making this analysis.
In Part II, this article will address the current tax structure,
which allows for double taxation. Part III will explain how the
three systems work to eliminate double taxation. Part IV will
briefly compare the three alternatives as they apply to dividends
received by foreign shareholders. The three alternatives will be
compared in two scenarios - with and without tax treaties to avoid
double taxation.' The analyses will be based on the current tax
treaty model, without examining the details of particular treaties.
Lastly, in Part V, this article will set forth some conclusions and
recommendations. This paper relies mostly on governmental
proposals, official reports on the corporate tax integration, and on
opinions of reliable commentators on the same issue. The official
documents and the academic analysis of the proposal provide
consistent clues to which directions the issue will take.
II. Taxation Under the Current System
Double taxation occurs in the United States in two ways:
double taxation of foreign-earned income and double taxation of
corporate dividends. Although tax treaties may provide some
relief to taxpayers, the United States does not have such treaties
with every country, limiting their overall effectiveness as a long-
term solution to the double taxation problem.
income. Id. The taxation of the foreign income also depends on whether it is passive or
active investment, will derive passive or active income, and on the level of control that
the American investor keeps on the foreign company. Id. See generally Eric. T. Laity,
Defining the Passive Income of Controlled Foreign Corporations, 21 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 293 (1996) (detailing the distinction between active and passive income of
foreign controlled corporations).
5 This approach is realistic because the Unites States does not have such treaties
with every country in the world, and the conclusions will be different depending on
whether or not a treaty applies.
[Vol. 29
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A. Taxation of Inbound Transactions
The United States, like many other countries, taxes its
nationals (individual and companies incorporated in the United
States) based on their worldwide income. This leads to double
taxation, because where a taxpayer has income from multiple
countries, the same income is taxed first by the country where it is
produced (source country) and second by the country where the
enterprise was founded or incorporated, or alternatively, the place
of residence (domicile or citizenship criterion).6
Inbound transactions, in the international sense, mean foreign
persons conducting business and/or earning profits in the United
States.7 The United States taxes foreign corporations and
individuals on income that has a sufficient nexus to the United
States.8 This taxable income may arise via active or direct
investment or passive investment.
Active or direct investment may include acquiring or leasing
of assets and conducting business in the United States.9 This
category includes foreign companies with branches, i.e.,
permanent establishments in the United States. Services rendered
in the United States generally may be considered inbound
transactions and therefore taxed." Income that is "effectively
connected with the conduct of trade or business" is taxed in the
same manner and at the same rates as the income of individuals
(citizens and resident aliens) and U.S. corporations - i.e., net
income at progressive rates, but for individuals after the 2003 Tax
6 For an introduction to this issue, see generally BORIS I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE
LOKKEN, 3 FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS para. 65.1 (3rd ed. 2002);
SAMUEL C. THOMPSON, JR., U.S TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS, 1-29
(1995); JOSEPH ISENBERGH, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION: U.S. TAXATION OF FOREIGN
PERSONS AND FOREIGN INCOME paras. 1.1-1.19 (3rd ed. 2003).
7 See Paul R. McDaniel, Integration in the International Context: Identifying
Principles for Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches, 47 TAX L. REV. 609, 610 (1992).
8 See I.R.C. § 861 (2003).
9 Charles 0. Roehrdanz, Reducing the U.S.-Japan Trade Deficit by Eliminating
Japanese Barriers to Foreign Direct Investment, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 305, 305 n. 1
(1995).
10 Christopher H. Hanna, International Tax: Some Modest Simplification Proposals
for Inbound Transactions, 56 SMU L. REV. 377, 378 (2003). Since the source of income
is the United States, but not effectively connected to U.S. trade or business, the income is
generally taxed at thirty percent on a gross-basis. I.R.C. § 861 (a)(3) (2003).
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Relief Act, the rate for dividends was decreased. 1 Tax treaties
may bring some relief for foreign companies doing business in the
United States if it is conducted through a "permanent
establishment" in the United States.
12
The second category of investment is passive investment, the
issue under analysis in this article. Passive investment occurs
when non-resident aliens and foreign corporations receive income
(as dividends) from U.S. sources without the conduct of trade or
business in the United States.13  Passive investment includes
dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and some similar types of
income derived from U.S. sources. The transactions may simply
be buying securities or properties in the U.S. market without
dealing with the operation of business.' 4  Because the foreign
11 See supra note 1 and accompanying text; see also I.R.C. §§ 1, l(h)(3), 11,
871(b), 872, 882 (2003). The income also may derive from activities performed without
a permanent establishment of the foreign company, but with the conduct of a trade or
business in the United States. The U.S. branch of a foreign corporation is subject to
regular income tax on income effectively connected with U.S. trade or business and is
also subject to a "branch profits tax" which is similar to the thirty percent withholding
tax. "In effect, the branch profits tax treats the branch as if it were a U.S. corporation."
I.R.C. § 884 (a); see Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S.
Perspective, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71, 84-85 (1995). When these dividends (after
regular tax and the branch profits tax) are sent to the parent corporation there is no
taxation again - that is to say the "branch profits tax" substitutes the withholding tax.
I.R.C. § 884(e)(3)(A (2003); see BITIKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, at para. 67.1.1;
THOMPSON JR., supra note 6, at 160-168.
12 See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, U.S. MODEL INCOME TAX CONVENTION OF
SEPTEMBER 20, 1996 (Sept. 20, 1996), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-
policy/library/mode1996.pdf [hereinafter MODEL CONVENTION]. The concept of
"permanent establishment" for tax treaty purposes is detailed in article 5 of the MODEL
CONVENTION; see also Michael Dezsi, U.S. Taxation of International E-Commerce: The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's New Commentary to its
Model Tax Convention Redefining Permanent Establishment, 79 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
123, 125-27 (2001).
13 Roehrdanz, supra note 9.
14 I.R.C. § 864 provides definitions for what is deemed to be direct or passive
investment in inbound transactions. In general, what is not service performed in the
United States, and is not income effectively connected to conduct of a trade or business
in the United States, is passive investment, e.g., trading in stock and securities. I.R.C. §
864(b)(2)(A)(i) (2003). The General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 dealing
with Passive Foreign Investment Companies, also gives some guidance: "[P]assive
income generally includes dividends, interest and its equivalents, passive rents and
royalties, annuities, gains form the disposition of stocks and securities and certain other
assets, certain gains from commodity trading, and certain foreign currency exchange
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investor receives dividends, he may be subject to taxation.' 5 When
a passive investment is in the form of mutual funds and income
from it is in the form of dividends, it is subject to a gross-basis
U.S. tax at a flat thirty percent rate.'6 The tax generally is
collected by means of withholding by the person making the
payment.' 7 This tax may be reduced or eliminated under an
income tax treaty. 18
B. Taxation of Dividends
Dividends paid by U.S. corporations, either received by
domestic or foreign shareholders, are also subject to double
taxation. The first level of taxation - the corporation level - is the
same for both, but the taxation of dividends at the shareholder
level is different. Under current law, domestic shareholders are
taxed on a net basis, and the tax rate may vary depending on the
taxpayer. 9 The general tax rate is fifteen percent for individuals,
and there are progressive rates for corporations.2 ° Dividends
received by foreign shareholders (individuals or corporations)
from domestic corporations sourced in the United States2 are
rates." THE GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, 1024-26 (1986);
see I.R.C. § 469(c)(2), (4) (2003); I.R.C. § 954(c)(1)(A), (2)(A) (2003); see also
Comment, Nonshelterable Passive Activities and "Better" Investment, 11 VA. TAX REV.
501, 501-02 (1991) (dealing with passive investment in general).
15 See Walter P. Donovan, "We Like Your Dollars": Amending the Tax Code to
Encourage Nonresident Alien Investment in Mutual Funds Managed in the United States,
19 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 215, 230 (1995).
16 Id. at 222.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 223.
19 See sources cited supra note 1.
20 Before the 2003 Tax Relief Act, dividends paid to individuals were levied at
progressive tax rates at the shareholder level. The 2003 Tax Relief Act did not change
the rates to dividends paid to corporations. The 2003 Tax Relief Act also gave relief to
dividends paid to individuals by foreign corporations. However, the dividends must be
"qualified", which happens when the foreign corporation is incorporated in a possession
of the United States, or is eligible for benefits of a comprehensive income tax treaty with
the United States which the Secretary determines is satisfactory. 1.R.C. §
1 l(h)(l 1)(B)(2), (C) (2003); see also sources cited supra note 1.
21 I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A) (2003). There are exceptions for domestic corporations,
which make an election under I.R.C. § 936 (2003) (deriving income from Puerto Rico or
a U.S. possession), and to the Domestic International Business Sales Corporation
(DISC). I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(A), (D) (2003). I.R.C. § 861 (a)(2) provides sourcing rules
2004]
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taxed on a gross basis (no deductions are allowed) with a flat rate
of thirty percent.22 Whether received by foreign or domestic
shareholders, dividends derived from U.S. sources are subject to
withholding tax.23  The Treasury Proposal does not modify this
treatment.24
Tax at the corporate level can be levied at the maximum rate of
thirty-five percent.25 Assuming the new rates from the 2003 Tax
Relief Act26 are applied, if this income is distributed as dividends27
to individual shareholders, the tax rate in the second layer may
reach fifteen percent and the total effective tax on corporate
income is calculated by combining the two layers of tax.28
to dividends received from foreign corporations. For instance, dividends received by
foreign shareholders from foreign corporations should not be taxed by the United States.
But I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B) provides that the portion attributable to U.S. business income
of the dividend may be treated as U.S. source income if twenty-five percent or more of a
foreign corporation's gross income is U.S. income for the three preceding years. I.R.C. §
861(a)(2)(B) (2003). It is clearly a disposition that carries difficulties in its
enforceability. Dividends paid by foreign corporations will be not addressed in this
paper.
22 See I.R.C. § 871(a) (2003) (for individuals); I.R.C. § 881 (2003) (for
corporations in general). There are exceptions to this general rule. When the dividends
paid are derived from foreign sources (eighty percent or more), there is no tax on that
attributable foreign dividend (it is deemed as a foreign corporation paying dividends to
foreign shareholders). I.R.C. § 871 (i) (2003). Dividends received by foreign
shareholders from "80-20" corporations are not taxed to the extent that such dividends
are derived from foreign sources. I.R.C. § 861(c). An "80-20" corporation is a
corporation that at least eighty percent of the gross income from all sources of such
corporation for the testing period (three-years period ending with the close of the taxable
year) is active foreign business income. I.R.C. §§ 861(c), 871(i)(2)(B) (2003); see
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, para. 67.2.
23 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, at para. 67.2.3; THOMPSON JR., supra note
6, at 110.
24 See REVENUE PROPOSAL 2004, supra note 1, at 12. The 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT
also did not change the treatment. See 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT, supra note 1.
25 I.R.C. § 11 (2003); see STEPHEN A. LIND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 13-14 (5 ed., 2002).
26 See 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT, supra note 1; see also infra note 32 and accompanying
text.
27 Dividends are the distributions by corporations to its shareholders, out of its
earning and profits. I.R.C. § 316(a) (2003). Besides this general definition, the I.R.C.
and Regulations provide other circumstances (e.g., a sale-repurchase transaction), which
originates payments, to be treated as dividends. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6,
at para. 67.2.3, sub-item I "Dividends."
28 ECONOMIC REPORT 2003, supra note 2, at 202.
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Combining the two layers, the tax rate can be as high as 44.75
percent.29  Domestic corporations receiving dividends from
domestic corporations generally are allowed a deduction of
seventy percent or more of the amount of dividends received.3 °
The 2003 Tax Relief Act3' does not directly affect the taxation
of dividends paid to foreign shareholders. The major consequence
of the 2003 Tax Relief Act was to increase the difference in
treatment between domestic and foreign shareholders, mostly to
resident shareholders in non-treaty countries. Nevertheless, the
effects of the 2003 Tax Relief Act are transitory, and the trend
toward tax integration is still alive.32
C. Tax Treaties
Income tax treaties are essentially bilateral agreements
reflecting mutual accommodations between the tax codes and
treasuries of the negotiating countries.33
29 Id. The example found in the ECONOMIC REPORT 2003 was based on a 38.6
percent tax rate at the shareholder level, which was changed by the 2003 Tax Relief Act.
Under the "old" rates the effective rate was as high as 60.1 percent. It is clear that the
amount of relief ("mitigation") that was given to individual shareholders for this case is
around fifteen percent (60.1 - 44.75 = 15.35 percent). Furthermore, for lower income
taxpayers (taxable at ten or fifteen percent marginal brackets), the tax rate for dividends
is five percent (or zero percent in the taxable year 2008), in this case, the mitigation is
bigger. I.R.C. § I(H)(1)(B) (2003). It is worth noting that these provisions will last only
until December 31, 2008, according to Sec. 303 of the 2003 Tax Relief Act, and that
certain dividends are excluded from the Tax Relief dispositions. I.R.C. § I(H)(1 1)(B)(ii)
(2003).
30 There are anti-abuse rules to prevent corporations creating capital loss. See
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, supra note 1, at 18. Additionally, the dividends-
received deduction on certain debt-financed portfolio stock is reduced. Id.
31 See 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT, supra note 1.
32 According to the Sec. 302 of the 2003 Tax Relief Act, it was enacted to be in
force until December 31, 2008. See 2003 TAx RELIEF ACT, supra note 1.
33 ISENBERGH, supra note 6, para. 101.1; see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note
6, at para. 65.1.6. Tax treaties to avoid double taxation are overwhelmingly bilateral (all
treaties to avoid double taxation signed by the U.S. are bilateral). See Michael J. Graetz
&, Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of U.S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE
L.J. 1021, 1105-1109 (1997). But see generally Yariv Brauner, An International Tax
Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REv. 259 (2003) (analyzing the new trend in
international taxation towards multilateral tax treaties); John K. Sweet, Formulating
International Tax Laws in the Age of Electronic Commerce: The Possible Ascendancy of
Residence-Based Taxation in an Era of Eroding Traditional Income Tax Principles, 146
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The problem of double taxation is as old as the history of tax
jurisdictions.34 However, solving double taxation by tax treaty is a
more recent phenomenon. In the nineteenth century, European
countries were the first to enter into tax treaties to avoid double
taxation, but there were few treaties.35 In the twentieth century,
mostly after World War I, the number of tax treaties increased as
the problem of double taxation became relevant for international
transactions.36 The adoption of income tax by the United States in
the beginning of the century increased its need for such treaties.37
In 1920, the League of Nations requested a report on double
taxation, which led to the first draft of a Model Convention in
1928.38 After World War II, as international trade increased, the
need for such treaties became increasingly evident. In 1963, the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) issued its Model Convention. This OECD Model has
being continuously updated. In 1980, the UNO issued the United
Nations Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed
and Developing Countries. One year later (1981), the United
U. PA. L. REV. 1949 (1998) (considering the necessity of new approaches to
international tax problems due to growth of the E-commerce, that includes a multilateral
tax treaty).
34 See MANUEL PIRES, INTERNATIONAL JURIDICAL DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME
93 (1989).
35 From 1894 to 1913 eleven general tax treaties were signed. Id. at 95.
36 Id. at 95-100.
37The Revenue Act of 1918 brought the allowance to credit against U.S. income
for taxes paid by a U.S. citizen or resident to foreign countries derived from income
earned outside the U.S. "[T]he fundamental structure for international taxation of income
announced nearly seven decades ago in the 1928 League of Nations Model Treaty forms
the common basis for more than twelve hundred bilateral tax treaties now in force
throughout the world. Despite massive changes in the world economy in the last seventy
years, the international tax regime formulated in the 1920s has survived remarkably
intact." See Graetz & O'Hear, supra note 33, at 1023.
3 8 Id. Hugh Ault affirmed:
The conceptual basis for modern tax treaties developed in the period between
the first and second world wars. 6 At that time, international economic relations
were developing rapidly, but cross border transactions were impeded by
overlapping tax claims, typically those of the county in which the
internationally-invested capital originated and the country in which the capital
was utilized.
Hugh J. Ault, Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties and the Division of the International
Tax Base: Principles and Practices, 47 TAX L. REV. 565, 567-68.
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States issued the United States Model Income Tax Convention,
which it withdrew in 1992. Four years later, the United States
approved the Model Convention of 1996. 39
The central focus of these treaties concerns the reduction of
double taxation on international transactions executed between
individuals and corporations of the treaty nations. 40 The incidence
of double taxation is often ameliorated through treaty provisions
permitting tax reductions or exemptions for one country's
residents on specific categories of income derived from the other
country. 4' These treaty provisions, when taken in the aggregate,
have the effect of reapportioning tax revenues between the
contracting nations.42 In this regard, these bilateral treaties often
serve an allocating function by shifting tax revenues from the
treasury of the income source country to that of the resident
country. 43 Additional benefits of tax treaties include equalizing
tax rates, 44  furthering trade, 45  and creating an international
39 See RoY ROHATGI, BASIC INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 43-44 (2002); see also
MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12.
40 ISENBERGH, supra note 6, para. 101.2. It should be noted, however, that the
ultimate effectiveness of any future bilateral tax treaty depends upon mutual adherence
to the agreement. There has been much concern among U.S. treaty partners regarding
Congress's tendency to override treaty provisions through amendments in the Internal
Revenue Code. See Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance
and Breach, 95 Am. J. INT'L L. 313, 319-22 (2001). Justification for such action derives
from the judicially recognized later-in-time rule, a doctrine which recognizes the
superiority of more recent statutes over conflicting past treaty provisions. See id. at 313.
Continued violations of double tax treaties by the unilateral actions of U.S. lawmakers
will undoubtedly undermine the legitimacy of such agreements and preclude the
avoidance of double taxation by international corporations. Id. However, the "scape
clause," which allows the United States "to utilize U.S. domestic law to tax its citizens
residing in other contracting states as though the treaty were not in effect" is not a treaty
override, but a treaty provision. See Doernberg, supra note 11, at 72-73.
41 ISENBERGH, supra note 6.
42 Id.
43 Id. para. 101.3.
44 Id. para. 101.2.2. In addition to the revenue shifting effects bilateral treaties
often create between the treasuries of partner nations, these agreements also affect the
taxation of individuals and business associations investing internationally. Id. Because
the income tax rates of the treaty nations usually differ, opportunities to invest in more
favorable tax regimes often arise. Id. For example, if the income tax rates in the country
of residence are lower than in the country of source, "exemption from tax in the country
of source under a treaty improves the tax regime of residents of the other country." Id.
The specific provisions contained in bilateral tax treaties are significantly influenced by
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [Vol. 29
enforcement system.46
The approaches of the OECD Model and the U.S. models are
based on the system of corporate taxation (double level).47 An
important issue in tax treaties is the differences in the level of
integration of corporate taxation in the two countries.48
The United States has entered into bilateral income tax treaties
with more than fifty countries in hopes of promoting international
trade and investment through the elimination of restrictive tax
the traditional pattern of economic trading between the two nations as developed by their
relative bargaining powers. See id. para. 101.3. For instance, technology and capital
importing countries will most likely negotiate for treaty provisions in which taxes on
royalties and licensing fees are imposed in the country of income source. Id. On the
other hand, those countries that exporters of technology and capital will bargain for
terms authorizing taxation by the country of residence on the owner of the exported
goods. Id. Generally, countries will "prefer one pattern in their treaties with some
countries and a different one in others, depending on the balance of flow of capital
between them." Id.
45 Id. para. 101.4. A further aim of bilateral tax treaties is the promotion of
economic transactions between two countries that might not otherwise be executed due
to overly burdensome national taxation. Id. The combination of government imposed
tax payments and the transactional costs associated with international trading often deter
business entities from expanding beyond their national borders. Id. Accordingly, treaty
provisions concerning the allocation of taxation on business profits is of central
importance to the contracting nations. Id. In this regard, the concept of "permanent
establishment" provides the "threshold of taxation" in bilateral income tax treaties. Id.
Specifically, a treaty nation will not tax the business profits of an enterprise located in
the other nation unless that enterprise conducts business there via a "permanent
establishment." Id. Treaty negotiations should determine what exactly constitutes a
"permanent establishment" in a particular agreement. Id.; see also MODEL CONVENTION,
supra note 12.
46 ISENBERGH, supra note 6, para. 101.6. Bilateral income tax treaties provide a
mechanism for the international enforcement of income tax regulations. Id. These
agreements seek to establish "dispute resolution procedures for transnational taxpayers,
mediat[e] differences between the treaty partners' tax systems, and provid[e] for the
exchange of tax information." Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a Strategic World
With Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1762-63 (1995).
47 It is clear because, as Hugh Ault noted,"[i]t recognizes the separate right of the
source state to tax dividend income in the hands of the investor after imposing a
corporate level tax on the profits from which the dividend is paid .. " Ault, supra note
38, at 569; see also MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 10.
48 See Ault, supra note 38, at 499-590, 594. Hugh Ault's article deals with the
effects of tax treaties, by assuming the U.S. to have adopted the dividend exclusion
system and considering two resident countries with opposite views - Germany
(integrated corporate tax) and Netherlands (classical system) - and also analyzing both
direct and indirect investment. Id. at 595-608.
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barriers.4 9  The most recent agreements largely reflect the
provisions found in the model income tax treaty issued by the U.S.
Treasury Department in 1996.50 The U.S. model, a slight variation
of the OECD model income tax treaty, serves as the foundation for
the Treasury Department when "formulating its initial position in
treaty negotiations."'" Article 10 of the 1996 Model Convention
suggests, in pertinent part, the following rules for taxing
dividends:
Article 10. Dividends
1. Dividends paid by a resident of a Contracting State to a
resident of the other Contracting State may be taxed in that other
State.
2. However, such dividends may also be taxed in the
Contracting State of which the payor is a resident and according
to the laws of that State, but if the dividends are beneficially
owned by a resident of the other Contracting State, except as
otherwise provided, the tax so charged shall not exceed:
a) 5 percent of the gross amount of the dividends if the
beneficial owner is a company that owns directly at least 10
percent of the voting stock of the company paying the
dividends;
b) 15 percent of the gross amount of the dividends in all
other cases.
This paragraph shall not affect the taxation of the
company in respect of the profits out of which the dividends
are paid.52
It is clear that dividends received by foreign shareholders are
taxed in the United States, thereby preserving double taxation,
albeit to a more limited degree. Article 10 contains other
provisions within its nine subparagraphs that offer explanations
and some exceptions to the general rule. 3 In most U.S. treaties,
for example, the business profits of a treaty nation resident are not
49 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, para. 65.1.6.
50 See MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12.
51 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, para. 65.1.6.
52 MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12, art. 10 (emphasis added).
53 See id.
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taxed unless that taxpayer possesses a permanent establishment in
the United States.54  Further, assuming the taxpayer has a
permanent establishment in the United States, only the profits
resulting 55from that permanent establishment are subject to
taxation.
It is also worthy to note that the existence of tax treaties is one
of the conditions to tax dividends paid to individuals from foreign
corporations at the low rates granted by the 2003 Tax Relief Act.56
This adds to the disadvantage of countries that do not have an
income tax treaty with the United States, particularly in terms of
investment allocation.
III. The Three Proposals
The current so-called "classical" tax system taxes corporate
profits at both the shareholder and corporate level, but corporate
profits may be taxed more than twice when distribution is made
through multiple unrelated corporations. This system brings
inherent distortion that would be avoided if the taxation were
integrated. The goal should be efficiency. Integration would
reduce three inherent distorted incentives: (1) to invest in
unincorporated businesses (such as limited liability partnerships)
over corporate businesses; (2) to finance corporate investments
with debt rather than new equity (because interest is deductible);
and (3) to retain earnings or to structure distributions of corporate
54 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, para. 65.1.6. The Technical Explanation
to the 1996 Model Convention affirms:
The Model is drawn from a number of sources. Instrumental in its
development was the U.S. Treasury Department's draft Model
Income Tax Convention, published on June 16, 1981 ("the 1981
Model") and withdrawn as an official U.S. Model on July 17, 1992,
the Model Double Taxation Convention on Income and Capital, and
its Commentaries, published by the OECD, as updated in 1995 ("the
OECD Model"), existing U.S. income tax treaties, recent U.S.
negotiating experience, current U.S. tax laws and policies, and
comments received from tax practitioners and other interested
parties.
U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION TO THE 1996 MODEL CONVENTION 2
(Sept. 20, 1996), http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/tax-policy/library/techxpln.pdf.
55 See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, para. 65.1.6
56 See 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT, supra note 1.
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profits in a manner that avoids double taxation.57 In order to
promote corporate tax integration related to dividends treatment,
the dividend exclusion, imputed system, and deduction proposals
have been raised.58
The discussion on double taxation of dividends is older than
the 1992 proposals.59 It is closely linked to the discussion on debt
and equity financing. The other aspect is that corporation and
shareholders are different subjects, that is, different persons, and
thus subject to tax as such. The judicial view of corporation and
shareholder as two different entities supports the concept of
double taxation. However, from an economic point of view, the
wealth belongs to the shareholders who own the corporation, and
they are still being taxed twice for the same wealth. Under this
conception, the corporation as a separate entity is only a legal
fiction. The discussion is not new. In 1989, the Reporter of the
American Law Institute (ALI) had outlined a set of proposals of
corporate tax reform to reduce the bias against equity finance;
however, it was not an integration proposal.6
57 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 2, at vii-viii, 1-14; see also ECONOMIC
REPORT 2003, supra note 1, at 202 (explaining that the double level taxation reduces
corporate investments and that the high tax on capital may also "discourage risk taking
and innovation through its effect on entrepreneurship"); REVENUE PROPOSAL 2004, supra
note 1, at 11 (stating that double taxation increases for corporations to engage in
transactions for the sole purpose of minimizing their tax liability).
58 Three basic alternatives were proposed by the Treasury Department: (1) the
dividend exclusion prototype; (2) the shareholder allocation prototype; and (3) the
Comprehensive Business Income Tax (CBIT) prototype. 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra
note 1, at viii. The later two proposals are not limited to dividends. Id. The shareholder
allocation prototype was intended to be a system "in which all corporate income is
allocated to shareholders and taxed in a manner similar to partnership income" - this
option is not acceptable for simplification concerns and also because the inherent
complexity of partnership taxation. Id. See generally, Lawrence Lokken, Taxation of
Private Business Firms: Imagining a Future Without Subchapter K, 4 FLA. TAX. REV.
249, 285-86 (1999) (explaining that the complexity of partnership tax scheme failed to
prevent manipulation in shifting loss and income). The other proposal named CBIT is a
very comprehensive model for corporate income tax that will not be analyzed here. The
Treasury Department in Part IV also described the imputation credit and the dividend
deduction prototype, which will be focused in comparison with the dividend exclusion
model. 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 93-110.
59 See sources cited supra note 1.
60 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 108; see also CHARLES E. McLURE,
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, MUST CORPORATE INCOME BE TAXED TWICE? (1979).
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The proposed systems eliminate the bias in favor of debt
instead of equity financing. However, it happens only at the
domestic level; at the international level, the bias still exists due to
the fact that the thirty percent withholding tax would not be
extinguished.6' It seems that the 2003 Tax Relief Act, which did
not have too much repercussion for foreign shareholders, also did
not eliminate that bias internally, regarding the "mitigation" of the
taxation at the shareholder's level.62
61 As a common feature to the three systems, the withholding tax would still apply
to dividends paid by U.S. corporations to foreign shareholders. Professor Doemberg,
rebutting the arguments in the 1992 TREASURY REPORT (at 77-80), which supports the
same position assumed at the REVENUE PROPOSAL 2004 (supra note 1, at 20, see also
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 32), expressed a different
point of view and made some arguments, e.g., that it (non-extension of integration to
foreign shareholders) contrasts with the treatment of direct foreign investment made in
the U.S. by a sole proprietor, partner or joint venturer (with only one level of taxation).
He also stated that the argument that the extension of the integration to foreign
shareholders would benefit only the foreign tax administrations and not the foreign
investor is not completely valid, arguing that there are other areas where the U.S. has
unilaterally extended tax reductions to nonresidents (e.g., portfolio interests exemption),
and that experience suggests that the foreign investors would route investments into the
U.S. through third countries to avoid or mitigate residence-state taxation. Professor
Doemberg stated: "The increase in U.S. corporate capital, the decrease in the use of debt,
more optimal corporate distribution policies, and an overall economic welfare gain all
argue for unilateral integration benefits for foreign as well as U.S. shareholders." See
Richard L. Doemberg, International Aspects of Individual and Corporate Tax
Integration, 4 TAX NOTES INT'L 535, 538-539 (1992). However, it does not appear that
there are any constitutional or statutory law problems in the United States that would bar
Congress from denying the benefits of integration to foreign shareholders. See McNulty,
supra note 1, at 247-48 (based on Professor Doemberg's conclusions)
62 See supra notes 1 and 33 and accompanying text. A good approach of the
measurement of the effect that "mitigation" at the shareholder level, shifting the
equilibrium point between equity and debt capitalization under the 2003 Tax Relief Act,
was presented by Anthony P. Polito as follows: "To the extent that the old view of
dividend distributions is accurate and dividends are taxed at the ordinary rate p[personal
income tax rate], it necessarily drives up the effective shareholder-level tax on equity,
and shifts the equilibrium of tax rates to favor debt capitalization. Even the taxation of
dividends at capital gains rates, as temporarily imposed by the Jobs and Growth Tax
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 302-303, 117 Stat. 752, 760-64,
does not eliminate the bias unless, at the margin, c [corporate tax rate] is significantly
lower than p. For a tax rate of thirty-five percent for interest income, and a fifteen
percent tax rate for dividends, equity is favored only for corporate tax rates below
approximately 23.5 percent. Even for a tax rate of forty percent for interest income,
equity is favored only for corporate tax rates below about 29.4 percent. For most publicly
traded corporations, the marginal corporate tax rate is thirty-four percent. I.R.C. 1 (b)
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A. Dividend Exclusion System
The first proposal to be examined is dividend exclusion. The
dividend exclusion system would remove the double taxation of
corporate dividends by allowing the corporation to continue to pay
tax on its income at the regular rate schedule63 and to allow
shareholders to exclude the dividends received6 4 from their tax
basis.
Dividend exclusion is more complicated than it might seem.
The system is designed to allow the exclusion only if the company
has paid tax on its taxable income in order to avoid double
taxation.6" This means that the amount of the dividends paid by a
corporation will not match up with its credited amount - called the
Excluded Dividend Amount (EDA) - because EDA takes into
consideration the alternative minimum tax payment (AMT) and
U.S. income taxes on foreign source income (which may be offset
by foreign tax credits).66 Calculation of EDA is also based on the
previous years' income taxes. Therefore, income taxes shown in
(2003)." Anthony P. Polito, Advancing to Corporate Tax Integration: A Laissez-Faire
Approach 55 S.C. L. REV. 1, 14, n.43 (2003).
63 For this purpose, the income tax includes the taxes imposed on corporation by
I.R.C. § 11 (corporate income tax), § 5 (alternative minimum tax), § 511 (unrelated
business income tax), etc. See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 19.
64 "For a distribution to be an excludable dividend, it must be a dividend under
current law, i.e., out of earnings and profits." REVENUE PROPOSAL 2004, supra note 1, at
15. But a corporation may alternatively permit its shareholders to increase the basis in
their stock, if dividend distributions are less than the Excludable Dividend Amount
(EDA). Id.
65 The Joint Committee on Taxation came up with the following description of the
proposal (as set forth in H.R. 2 - introduced by Chairman Thomas, and S.2 - introduced
by Senators Nickles and Miller on February 27, 2003):
Under the proposal, the excludable portion of any dividend received by a
shareholder is not included in gross income. The excludable portion of any
dividend is the portion of the dividend which bears the same ratio to the
dividend as the amount of the corporation's EDA for a calendar year bears to all
dividends paid by the corporation during the calendar year. The EDA, as
discussed below, generally measures the corporation's fully taxed income
reduced by taxes paid. In addition, shareholders are allowed to increase the
basis in their income stock to the extent the EDA exceeds the dividends paid by
the corporation during the calendar year. These rules apply to both individual
and corporate shareholders.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 18.
66 See REVENuE PROPOSAL 2004, supra note 1, at 13-14..
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tax returns filed in Year 1 will be used to compute the EDA for
Year 2.67 The EDA will be determined for each year based on the
formula: EDA = (U.S. income taxes before foreign tax credit) /
(0.35) - (U.S. income taxes).6" For corporate shareholders, an
excludable dividend received by a U.S. corporation will not be
taxable and will increase the recipient corporation's EDA,
remaining excludable even when redistributed by the recipient
corporation to its shareholders.69
Despite being a controversial issue, dividend exclusion is not a
new concept. Many countries already have a dividend exclusion
system in place. For example, Germany and Luxembourg provide
fifty percent dividend exclusions to individuals (thus, if $1,000 in
dividends is received, only $500 is taxed) and Greece provides a
one hundred percent exclusion (fully exempting dividends from
individual taxation).70
The dividend exclusion proposal seems to be gaining great
support throughout the United States, especially in the Bush
Administration. In January 2003, President Bush proposed the
creation of dividend exclusions because of his belief that
eliminating the double taxation of dividends would provide a
strong boost to the economy by injecting cash into the economy
and cutting capital costs to businesses. However, Congress did not
approve the proposal, but rather the 2003 Tax Relief Act.71
B. Imputation System
The second proposal to be examined is imputation. Under the
imputation system, a company pays tax on its taxable income.
After dividend distribution, the shareholder rebuilds the basis by
adding the tax paid by the corporation to the dividend received. A
shareholder's tax liability is computed by applying the
shareholder's marginal rate on the grossed-up amount of the
dividend and then applying the amount paid by the corporation as
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 See id. at 20.
70 Chris Edwards, Dividend Taxation: U.S. Has the Second Highest Rate, (last
modified Jan. 17, 2003), http://www.cato.org/cgi-bin/scripts/printtech.cgi/dailys/01-17-
03-2.html.
71 See 2003 TAX RELIEF ACT, supra note 1.
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a tax credit.72 The credit is nonrefundable, meaning that it will
only reduce the taxpayer's tax liability to zero.73
For example, under the previous tax rates for dividends,74
Corporation A has taxable income of $100. Assuming a thirty-
five percent corporate tax rate, Corporation A would pay a tax of
$35 with $65 remaining for distribution. In our present system,
Shareholder B, the sole shareholder, would then receive the $65 as
a corporate dividend, subject to Shareholder B's tax rate (here,
38.6%), leaving after-tax income to the shareholder of $39.91.
The result is a double taxation rate exceeding sixty percent, in the
aggregate, of the original $100 earned by Corporation A.75
Compare this to the imputation system. Corporation A has the
same taxable income, pays the same tax rate, and pays the
remainder ($65) as a dividend to its sole shareholder, Shareholder
B. But now the dividend is grossed-up by the amount of tax paid
by Corporation A of $35, providing a total grossed-up dividend of
$100 to Shareholder B. The grossed-up dividend would then be
subject to Shareholder B's tax rate (again, 38.6%), creating a tax
liability of $38.60. This tax liability is then offset by a credit in
the amount paid by Corporation A as tax ($35), reducing
Shareholder B's net tax liability on the dividend to $3.60. This
leaves Shareholder B with $61.40 of the original $100 net income
of Corporation A, a single aggregate tax rate of 38.6%.76
72 This is similar to the American Law Institute (ALl) shareholder imputation
credit proposal that "ultimately eliminates the corporate-level tax by allowing payment
of the corporate tax to provide a credit when shareholders receive distributions and are
taxed on them." McNulty, supra note 1, at 202.
73 See 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 95.
74 Referring to acts prior to the 2003 Tax Relief Act, see sources cited at
supra note 1 and accompanying text.
75 Present System:
Corporation level:
Taxable income: $100.00
Minus tax @ 35%: - $ 35.00
S 65.00 Dividend paid
Individual level:
Dividend received: $ 65.00
Minus tax @ 38.6%: - $ 25.09
S 39.91 Net benefit to individual
76 Imputation System:
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After the 2003 Tax Relief Act,7 7 assuming the fifteen percent
rate for qualified dividends, the same example would leave the
shareholder with $55.75 without the imputation system.7 s Also
considering the 15 percent dividend income tax rate but with the
imputation system in force, it would leave the shareholder with
$65. 79 It seems that this system is not workable when the second
Corporation level:
Taxable income:
Minus tax @ 35%:
Individual level:
Dividend received:
Grossed-up by Corp.'s tax:
Grossed-up dividend:
Minus tax @ 38.6%:
Plus credit for Corp.'s tax:
S 100.00
- $ 35.00
$ 65.00 Dividend paid
$ 65.00
+$ 35.00
$ 100.00 Grossed-up dividend
$ 100.00
- S 38.60
+ $ 35.00
$ 3.60 Tax payable by individual
Dividend received: $ 65.00
Minus tax payable: - $ 3.60
$ 61.40
77 See sources cited supra notes 1, 24 and
78 Present System:
Corporation level:
Taxable income: $ 100.00
Minus tax @ 35%: - $ 35.00
$ 65.00
Individual level:
Dividend received:
Minus tax @ 15%:
79 Imputation System:
Corporation level:
Taxable income:
Minus tax @ 35%:
Net benefit to individual
33.
Dividend paid
$ 65.00
-$ 9.75
$ 55.25 Net benefit to individual
$100.00
- $ 35.00
$ 65.00 Dividend paid
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level of taxation (shareholder) is taxed under lower tax rates than
the first level (corporation). In such a situation, the result would be
the same as an exemption to received dividends. The imputation
method may be implemented using a credit limitation system, "in
which tax is collected only at the shareholder level on distributed
preference income," similar to the dividend exclusion method.8"
C. Deduction System
The third proposal is the deduction system, which is quite
simple. Under this system, interest and dividends would both be
deductible, thereby reducing or eliminating the corporation's
taxable income." In other words, the income that flows through
the corporation to the shareholders would only be taxed at the
shareholder level as ordinary income. If a corporation distributes
all net income as dividends, then the corporation would not be
taxed, and only the shareholders would be taxed at the shareholder
level.82 As a result, there would be only one level of taxation.
Individual level:
Dividend received: $ 65.00
Grossed-up by Corp.'s tax: + $ 35.00
$100.00 Grossed-up dividend
Grossed-up dividend: $ 100.00
Minus tax @ 15.00 - $ 15.00
Plus credit for Corp.'s tax: + $ 35.00
$ 20.00 Tax credit (not refundable)
Dividend received: $ 65.00
Minus tax payable: - $ 0.00
$ 65.00 Net benefit to individual
80 Instead of adopting a compensatory tax system "in which a tax, creditable by
shareholders, is collected at the corporate level on distributed preference income," the
decision considered the factors of "not ... eliminat[ing] the corporate level tax on
earnings distributed to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders and not... treat[ing]
identically U.S. corporate level taxes paid and foreign taxes on corporations' foreign
source income." 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 97.
81 See 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 107.
82 In a limit case, where all the shareholders of a certain corporation are exempt,
and all the net income is distributed as dividends, then there will no tax to collect. This
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The rationale for the deduction system is that it results in
"equivalent treatment for debt and equity and that it taxes
distributions at the shareholder rate. 83 It was not fully considered
by the 1992 Treasury Report because it produces results contrary
to the general recommendations of the Department of Treasury.84
The report states that integration should not be an occasion to
eliminate the corporate level tax "imposed under current law on
distributions to tax-exempt and foreign shareholders" because of
its results, and also because a dividend deduction would be more
expensive than either a dividend exclusion or imputation credit
system.85
IV. The Three Alternatives Compared
The exclusion, imputation, and deduction proposals share one
outcome - eliminating double taxation - but they differ in
complexity and application. Further, the effects of tax treaties
upon the three proposals cause different outcomes to occur as
well. To show the different outcomes, it is helpful to compare the
proposals in the context of passive investment by foreign
shareholders.
A. Comparison Without Tax Treaties
1. Dividend Exclusion System
Under the proposed dividend exclusion system, foreign
shareholders will be subject to a thirty percent withholding tax86
on dividends received, whether or not the dividends are
excludable.87 The Joint Committee on Taxation said that "[i]n the
type of situation works against the deduction system.
83 However, the equivalence is not perfect because interest is deductible when it
accrues and dividends are deductible when they are paid. See 1992 TREASURY REPORT,
supra note 1, at 107.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 The withholding tax will also apply to distributions from CREBA, but will not
apply to Retained Earnings Basis Adjustment (REBA). See REVENUE PROPOSAL 2004,
supra note 1, at 20. "REBA allocable to stock held by a foreign shareholder will not
increase the basis of the foreign shareholder's stock. Id. Any distributions to an origin
shareholder from CREBA will not decrease the foreign shareholder's stock basis." Id.
87 See id.; see also JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 32. It is
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case of foreign shareholders, withholding taxes applies to all
dividends and distributions received from Cumulative Retained
Earnings Basis Adjustment (CREBA). Dividends are not treated
as excludable and basis adjustments are not made with respect to
stock held by foreign persons.""
U.S. corporations paying dividends will be taxed at the
corporate level. Thus, under this system there will no change for
foreign shareholders.89 A foreign corporation that has U.S.
shareholders and receives dividends from one or more U.S.
corporations, however, will have to maintain the proper accounts
(for computations and distributions of EDA and CREBA) and
make the computations and allocations if it wishes to pay
excludable dividends to its shareholders or allocate basis
adjustments to them. 90  This requirement that the foreign
shareholders continue to maintain the financial allocations shows
that the enforcement of the dividend exclusion policy is a difficult
issue.
2. Imputation System
Under the imputation credit system, foreign shareholders
would remain subject to two levels of U.S. tax, simply because
imputation credits would not be available to foreign shareholders.
Thus, current withholding of taxes would be applied.9"
also in accordance with the position expressed by some scholars, that "[i]ntegration
should be extended to foreign shareholders only through treaty negotiations, not by
statute" and that "[d]ividend exclusion would most likely not be extended to foreign
shareholders, nor would it treat foreign taxes paid by United States corporations the same
as taxes paid to the United States, except by treaty negotiations." John Livingston,
Corporate Tax Integration in the United States: A Review of the Treasury's Integration
Study, 58 Mo. L. REV. 717, 721, 724 (1993).
88 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 22.
89 One may say that there is a change related to the U.S. branch of a foreign
corporation that is subject to regular income tax on income effectively connect with U.S.
trade or business and the "branch profits tax". See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 6, at
para. 76.1; see also Ault, supra note 38, at 605-06 (comparing the effects of taxation the
Netherlands, a country which also adopts the double corporate taxation; the effect is a
final tax rate as high as 81.5 percent for the foreign shareholder, which is clearly a
"prohibitive" rate).
90 See JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 33.
91 "Neither approach [dividend exclusion and imputation credit] would treat
inbound investment more harshly than under current law, because deferral of the second
level of tax would continue." 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
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In other words, the rules that domestic law can impose on
domestic shareholders to calculate the imputed credit (which
corresponds to tax paid at corporate level) cannot be applied to
foreign shareholders. Foreign shareholders are subject to a thirty
percent withholding tax and to their own tax jurisdictions. To
extend the benefits of the integration under the imputation system
to foreign shareholders while keeping the withholding tax intact
would require the withholding tax rate to take into consideration
the income tax rate of each shareholder's country. As a result, the
withholding tax rates would have to be the difference between the
income tax rates of the shareholder's country and the U.S.
corporate tax rate. It is obvious that such a method is completely
unfeasible.
3. Deduction System
In the case of a dividend deduction, the corporation would be
allowed the dividend deduction, but the foreign shareholder would
be subject to the thirty percent withholding tax. In this case, the
final result of the system would be preserved, considering that the
thirty percent flat rate is roughly equivalent to the net basis and
graduate rates paid by national shareholders.92 On the other hand,
in order to maintain the current tax burden on foreign
shareholders, the withholding tax rate would have to represent the
amount paid at the corporation level plus thirty percent. To
maintain parity with dividend reduction for domestic corporations,
the branch profits tax on domestic branches of foreign
corporations presumably would be modified.93
Thus, one can say that without considering tax treaties, and
assuming that the effects of integration would be extended to
foreign shareholders, the deduction method would not bring
92 However, this affirmation is not completely true if one considers the
individual shareholders. Under the current levels of tax rates for dividends
(2003 Tax Relief Act), if a deduction system were adopted without restrictions,
foreign individual shareholders would still paying more tax than domestic ones,
due to the withholding thirty percent tax, while internal tax rate is fifteen
percent or lower. See sources cited supra notes 1, 24 and 33.
93 Id. at 107; see also sources cited supra note 14. Richard L. Doernberg sustained:
"An extension of the benefits of integration to nonresidents logically entails the
elimination of the branch profits tax, which was enacted to take the place of a second-
tier withholding tax on dividends paid from a corporation to its shareholders." See
Doemberg, supra note 61, at 540.
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problems; instead, it would make the system simpler (as is easy to
see in a hypothetical situation where there would be only foreign
shareholders). Considering that it is not the goal of the integration
of corporate tax proposal to give relief to foreign shareholders, if
this method was adopted, it would be necessary to create a rule to
deny deduction for dividends paid to foreigners and to maintain
the thirty percent withholding tax. The problem is that the
suggested rule easily would be avoided by using a third party
national to intermediate the gains.
B. Effects of Tax Treaties
The adoption of an integrated corporate tax system may upset
(or offset) the balance of interests that are contained in the tax
treaties signed by the United States. Specifically,
traditional treaty rules reflect an allocation of revenue based on
the classical, two-tier system for corporations and shareholders:
the source country generally has the exclusive right to tax
business profits earned therein by a domestic corporation and
the two countries divide the right to tax profits when distributed,
with the greater share of this revenue going to the residence
country. Integration, of course, alters the original pool of tax
revenue by decreasing the total (assuming no offsetting rate
increases) and by reallocating it between the shareholder and
corporation.
94
The Department of Treasury recommended that foreign
shareholders not be granted benefits of integration received by
U.S. shareholders, except through treaty negotiation, arguing that
most of the trading partners of the United States that have adopted
similar systems of integrated corporate tax have followed the same
approach.95 Although the Department of Treasury's rationale may
be correct, it is important to remember that the exemption for
interests paid to foreign investors was a consequence of "market
pressure" - specifically, a mechanism to attract foreign investment
- and it was done by means of a statute. This kind of "market
pressure" is likely to affect dividends as well.
The branch profits tax9 6 could be considered a violation of tax
94 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
95 See id. at 16, 74; see also sources cited supra note 79.
96 See sources cited supra note 24.
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treaties as a consequence of the adoption of the integrated tax
system, which reduces to one level the taxation on corporations.
The question arises because the tax is imposed on a foreign
corporation's branch (a permanent establishment), and not on the
foreign establishment. Article 24, Paragraph 2 of the 1996 Model
Convention states:
The taxation on a permanent establishment or fixed base that a
resident or enterprise of a Contracting State has in the other
Contracting State shall not be less favorably levied in that other
State than the taxation levied on enterprises or residents of that
other State carrying on the same activities.
97
Thus, the difference of treatment between the national
corporation and the permanent establishment or fixed base
(branch) that a resident or enterprise of another country has in the
United States should be considered a violation of the treaty. But
Article 10 of the 1996 Model Convention explicitly allows this
treatment as to dividends,98 resulting in no violation. If an income
tax treaty does not have a similar clause, there would be a conflict
(a violation of the treaty), but the most recently enacted law - here
the tax treaty - would prevail. 9
1. Dividend Exclusion System
The proposed dividend exclusion system should be integrated
into tax treaties because it permits the source country the ability to
retain its corporate tax revenue. Thus, the U.S. companies that
pay dividends could be taxed only at the corporate level, the
withholding tax could be eliminated or reduced in distributions to
treaty residents, and the shareholder's country could credit the
source country's taxes in order to calculate the shareholder's tax
liability. 100
2. Imputation System
Under this system, foreign shareholders would be subject to
current withholding taxes, but the tax treaty would give some
relief - five or fifteen percent, depending on the shareholder,
97 MODEL CONVENTION, supra note 12.
98 Id.
99 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
100 See 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
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instead of thirty percent to other countries. The tax at the
corporate level would also be retained, making this system suitable
to the current tax treaties.
There are some questions about this position. Some have
concluded that refusing to extend by statute the imputation credit
to foreign shareholders would violate the treaties. However, the
reason that the system does not violate the treaties, which is also
valid regarding the dividend exclusion system, is that no treaty
requires that foreign shareholders receive the same tax credits as
domestic shareholders, because "allowing or denying the
imputation credit to the shareholders is an issue of how to tax the
shareholder, not the corporation." 101
Reducing the withholding tax rate for foreign shareholders also
is suitable to the current system because it would roughly
represent an approximation of the actual tax burden. However, if
the intent were to extend the integration to other countries by
allowing the foreign shareholder to use the income tax paid by
U.S. corporations as credit against the domestic tax, 10 2 there are
further considerations. In this specific case, this "total integration
system" would be feasible only if the other country also has
adopted an integrated system similar to the one adopted by the
United States. Otherwise, depending on the foreign income tax
rates, it would create unfair discrimination to the foreign country's
taxpayers.
3. Deduction Method System
In the case of dividend deductions, the corporation would be
allowed a dividend deduction, but the foreign shareholder would
be subject to a thirty percent withholding tax. Bearing in mind
that tax treaties may reduce the tax rates to as low as five or fifteen
101 1992 TREASURY REPORT, supra note 1, at 79.
102 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 69; see also Ault, supra note 38, at 597-99
(analyzing the U.S.-Germany case (Germany adopts the imputation system); German
taxpayers are allowed to gross up the basis and credit the foreign paid tax (withholding)
against the tax due in Germany). The described mechanism for relief is the classical
allowance of the source country withholding tax as credit for the foreign shareholder.
However, in the present case, to grant the fully integration of corporate tax, the credit
would be the tax paid at the corporation level to the source country, and without
withholding tax at distribution to foreign shareholder. Otherwise, it would be the just the
same "classical system", and the treaty would only be giving some tax relief by reducing
the rate of the withholding taxation.
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percent, and also considering the deductibility of dividends paid,
this method would lead to a considerable reduction of the tax
burden. For instance, a corporation that pays dividends
corresponding to all net income would not be taxed, and if the
foreign shareholder recipient of the dividends is a company that
directly owns at least ten percent of the voting stock of the
company paying the dividends, the foreign shareholder would pay
only five percent on the dividends received, without internal
taxation. 103
Considering the tax treaties and other forms of tax relief, the
deduction method may yield considerable tax breaks, almost
equivalent to an exemption at both levels (corporate and foreign
shareholder). Also, under this method, there will be only one level
of taxation for dividends paid. If the aim of the proposal is to not
provide any relief to foreign shareholders, then it would be
necessary to adopt a rule to deny deduction for dividends paid to
foreigners, but to keep the thirty percent withholding tax (which
may be reduced by treaty provisions). It seems that such a rule
(one with no allowance for dividend deductions), however, would
violate the tax treaties obligations."
V. Conclusion
According to the proposal, foreign shareholders may not get a
tax break as a result of the integration of corporate tax. Indeed,
the system that was proposed (dividend exclusion) is
consentaneous with this idea. Thus, if the thirty percent
withholding tax for foreign shareholders is preserved, there will be
no direct impact on foreign shareholders - taxation will change
only for domestic shareholders.
Of the three proposals analyzed in this article, only the
dividend deduction model would bring the undesirable effect of a
tax break to foreign shareholders. Therefore, this model should be
avoided. The other two models, dividend exclusion and
imputation system, do not create this problem because they
preserve the taxation at the corporate level. Both the dividend
exclusion and imputation systems create this desired effect and do
not reduce the tax level of foreign shareholders, but the imputation
103 See supra Part H.C.
104 See 1992 TREASuRY REPORT, supra note 1, at 80.
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system is more complex. Thus, the preferred method of
integration is the dividend exclusion.
However, no matter which system of integration is used, there
will be an indirect impact on foreign shareholders. Once
implementation has been achieved, U.S. companies may change
their equity strategies and corporate structures to take advantage of
the increase in equity investments. As a result, the stock market
will be more profitable and attract more foreign investors.
However, the bias favoring debt over equity, even at the
international level, will continue to exist because dividends paid to
foreign shareholders are still taxed at the second level (thirty
percent flat tax). Thus, while the proposed system eliminates the
bias internally, it does not have the same result at the international
level. As a result, there is no capital import neutrality because
investments within the United States will be more heavily taxed if
owned by foreign shareholders than domestic shareholders." 5
Keeping the second level of taxation for foreign shareholders,
however, is inefficient from an economic standpoint.'0 6 It will
cause foreign investment to be allocated in sheltered forms simply
to avoid the withholding tax."0 7 Thus, if the aim of the proposal
105 The Joint Committee on Taxation determined that:
The proposal is not neutral with respect to the source of investment
fund. That is, the proposal generally would not change the after-tax
return to investment by foreign persons. Therefore, some observe
that to the extent that foreign persons are an important source of
marginal investment capital there would be no incentive to increase
aggregate investment in the United States.
JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION 2003, supra note 1, at 32; see also McNulty, supra note
1, at 243-47.
106 One well-respected commentator concluded that:
Unless the integration system in the United States did extend its
benefits to foreign shareholders and foreign taxes, the result would
be undesirable economic and legal effects .... Presumably the
governments of trading partners of the United States would object to
this differential treatment of foreign taxes and foreign shareholders.
Doing away with these effects would tend to promote 'the efficient
international allocation of capital' and hence 'would maximize
economic welfare.'
McNulty, supra note 1, at 237.
107 "Multinational corporations will undoubtedly attempt various devices to
maximize the allocation of EDA to U.S. shareholder distributions and to minimize its
allocation to foreign distribution." Lorence L. Bravenec & Fred Feucht, The Bush
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
was to make the system more neutral in terms of "capital import
neutrality," the better option would be to extinguish the thirty
percent withholding tax to foreign shareholders, giving them the
same treatment that is given to domestic shareholders - that is,
only one level of taxation.° 8
Taking into consideration the existing treaties, which were
negotiated under the classic double level of taxation on dividends,
it can be said that the dividend exclusion and the imputation
system would be feasible and may be integrated into the current
tax treaties. But, in the case of the dividend deduction system, it
would have as a consequence a reduction of the tax burden.
Because the remedies for avoiding this reduction may violate tax
treaty dispositions, this system shall not be accepted.
Tax treaties should extend the integration model to their
parties as a matter of tax policy. However, assuming tax treaties
are a strong tool for making trade policy and taking into
consideration issues like reciprocity and the entire economic effect
of the treaty, it seems that the decision whether to tax foreign
shareholders involves more than simple economic analysis but
also trade and political issues.
Administration's Proposed Dividends Exclusion, 98 TAX NoTEs 1251, 1254 n.29 (2003),
available at http://www.lexis.com.
108 Ten years ago (1994), Professor McNulty said:
If and when the United States adopts some form of integration or
dividend relief, it will be doing so in an international context in
which it should extend its domestic integration benefits to foreign
income taxes and to foreign shareholders. Preferably unilaterally (by
statute), as it has done with the foreign tax credit, for reasons of
international comity and leadership, economics neutrality, and to
induce and encourage other countries to follow this modern, selfless
approach.
McNulty, supra note 1, at 250.
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